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ABSTRACT 
The article describes the model of cybersecurity means financing strategies of the information object with 
incomplete information about the financial resources of the attacking side. The proposed model is the core 
of the module of the developed decision support system in the problems of choosing rational investing 
variants for information protection and cybersecurity of various information objects. The model allows to 
find financial solutions using the tools of the theory of multistep games with several terminal surfaces. The 
authors proposed an approach that allows information security management to make a preliminary 
assessment of strategies for financing the effective cybersecurity systems. The model is distinguished by the 
assumption that the protection side does not have complete information, both about the financing strategies 
of the attacking side, and about its financial resources state aimed at overcoming cybersecurity lines of the 
information object. At the same time, the protection side has the opportunity to obtain additional information 
by the part of its financial resources. This makes it possible for the protection side to obtain a positive result 
for itself in the case when it can not be received without this procedure. The solution was found using a 
mathematical apparatus of a nonlinear multistep quality game with several terminal surfaces with alternate 
moves. In order to verify the adequacy of the model there was implemented a multivariate computational 
experiment. The results of this experiment are described in the article. 
 
Key words: Cybersecurity, Information Protection, Informatization Object, Theory Of Games, The Choice 
Of Financing Strategy, Procedure Of Additional Data Obtaining, Decision Support System. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays almost any informatization object (IO) 
has its commercial secrets. Such IOs, as a rule, have 
their own information security system (ISS) and 
cybersecurity (CS). Modern ISS and CS are many 
echeloned complexes that include antivirus 
software, firewalls, attack and anomalies detection 
systems in the network, cryptographic applications, 
etc. The listed methods and means of information 
protection and cybersecurity can sufficiently reliably 
protect information resources of various IO from 
external threats. However, not always at the 
implementation of ISS and CS an important leakage 
channel for secret data, such as personnel data, is 
taken into account. In works [1, 2] there was shown 
that data protection from insiders is a permanent and 
universal problem that does not depend on the scale 
of the IO. Various kinds of data, obtained from 
insiders, can serve as a basis for choosing different 
strategies (including financing strategy) for the 
attacking side. At the same time, we believe that the 
actions of hackers (the attacking side) are also 
associated with the costs of financial resources for 
hacking [3]. As a source of additional data obtaining 
about the attacking side, you can use closed data for 
obtaining of which we need a financial resource of 
the protection side. For example, additional 
information about new hacking technologies, used 
by hackers, or the search for an insider within the 
framework of the IO. 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 
15th January 2020. Vol.98. No 01 
 © 2005 – ongoing  JATIT & LLS   
 ISSN: 1992-8645                                                                  www.jatit.org                                                      E-ISSN: 1817-3195 
 2 
 
In works [4, 5] there is shown that one of the main 
problems at the construction of complex ISS and CS 
is the choice of a rational financing strategy for such 
IO protection systems. The established in recent 
years trend for the intellectualization of decision-
making support [6, 7] in the field of the IO 
cybersecurity problems allowed to take a fresh look 
at the yet unsolved problems for such systems. In 
particular, the actual is the problem of the 
development new models for the selection of rational 
strategies for ISS and CS financing, in particular for 
situations when new hacking technologies cause a 
change in the level of cyber risks for IO, and, 
therefore, lead to the need to revise financing 
strategies for the information and cybersecurity 
protection. 
 
2. THE AIM OF THE ARTICLE 
 
The aim of the article is the development of a 
model for a decision support system for the selection 
of rational strategies for cybersecurity systems 
financing of the informatization object, taking into 
account the procedure of additional data obtaining 
about the attacking side by the protection side and 
about the corresponding financial resource costs for 
cybersecurity systems. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In works [8–10] there were described in details the 
methodologies for creating various modules for the 
decision support systems in the field of ISS and CS 
financing for information systems of various 
purposes. A common disadvantage suggested by 
various authors of approaches is the absence of the 
considered variants for choosing financing strategies 
in the ISS and CS, in situations where the protection 
side does not have complete information about the 
financial resources (FR) of the attacking side. In fact, 
this is important information [11], because it allows 
eventually to understand the potential capabilities of 
hackers. The financial resource, even of the powerful 
hacker group, and the cyber warfare resource of the 
potential enemy side can be differ at times [3]. 
Our new research develops ideas that were 
previously described by the authors in [12, 13]. In 
the framework of the previously proposed scheme 
for selecting financing strategies in the ISS and CS 
of IO, based on the theory of games. In accordance 
with similar works, based also on the theory [14, 15], 
there are considered two sides: player №1 - 
information protector (IP); player №2 - a hacker. 
Both players use financial resources in order to 
achieve their goals [13, 16]. We should note that in 
the framework of the analysis of the available 
approaches we were not able to find detailed 
calculations that consider the situation when the IP 
has full information about the FR of the attackers. 
According to the [13, 14, 16-18] the difference from 
the game with complete information is that the IP 
does not know exactly the initial financial state of the 
second player (hacker). 
Taking into account the above mentioned, it 
seems relevant to improve the model for choosing 
rational financing strategies of ISS and CS of IO 
with the introduction of the procedure of additional 
data obtaining by the protection side by the cost of 
part of own resources for its obtaining. 
 
4. MODELS AND METHODS 
 
In works [13, 17] there are considered situations 
when were found the sets of preference for the first 
player and his optimal strategies. This meant that if 
the states of the players belong to the set of 
preferences of the first player, then he has a strategy, 
the implementation of which will allow him to 
achieve his goal. Thus, with a given probability, the 
first player (information protector - IP) brings the 
system to a state that reflects a positive result for 
him. However, situations are possible where the 
protector is required to obtain a positive result for 
him from the states from which he can not do it under 
the standard setting of the game rules. For example, 
he is limited in time of interaction. Then it seems 
appropriate to introduce a procedure of additional 
data obtaining by the cost of part of own resources 
for its obtaining. 
 
 
4.1. Problem Statement 
 
Below there is formulated the problem statement 
of financing of the information protector and its 
cracker (hacker) with the introduction of the 
procedure of additional data obtaining by the cost of 
part of IP’s resources for its obtaining. 
There are two players (two sides). One player is 
IP (for example, the information system protector - 
ISP). The second player is the cracker of the 
information system (hacker). The first player seeks 
to protect his IS. The second one - to crack the 
system in order to disrupt its normal functioning. 
Both players need financial resources to realize 
their goals. We assume that for a given period of 
time  T,...,1,0  (T is a natural number) IP has 
 0x financial resources (FR). The second player, 
respectively –  0y . These resources determine the 
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predicted, at the time 0t , value of FR that players 
have to achieve their goals. There is an interaction of 
players. This interaction will be described as a 
bilinear multistep game with sequential steps with 
incomplete information. Unlike the game with full 
information, IP does not known exactly the initial 
state of the second player. However, the IP knows 
the distribution function of the initial states  0F  of the second player. This function is a uniform 
distribution on the segment    Rrar,a . 
Also, the first player knows the initial state and the 
parameters that determine the interaction and, in 
addition, at each moment of time t he knows all his 
own states  x  for t.  It is assumed that the first player (IP) can receive additional data by the cost of 
a part of his FR. It can be possible with the 
introduction of a parameter   0,1kk  that determines the part of the resource of the first player. 
This part of the FR is equal to   zk 1  (here z is the 
value of the IP’s resource), which goes to obtain 
information that the random states y of the second 
player (hacker) are evenly distributed on the segment  dkсd,kс 22   (here  dсd,с   – the segment 
on which the random states y are distributed). 
Conclusions are conducted from the position of the 
first player (IP), therefore there are no assumptions 
about the awareness of the second player (hacker). 
Steps are made in turn. At even moments, the first 
player makes a step, at uneven - the second player 
takes the step. 
Let nt 2  and    1, txtx  – the states of the 
first player at the moments of time 1, tt . Also 
   1, tyty  - the random states of the second 
player at the moments of time 1, tt . Then the states 
of players at the moment of time 2,1  tt  are determined from the relations: 
 
               ;1 txtktutxtktx      
         ;1 1 txtktustyty     
 (1) 
 
         ;112  tytvtyty       
       ;112 2  tytvstxtx     
 (2) 
 
here 
 
                  .0,0
;1,0,1,0,1,0:,,
21 

ss
tktvtutktvtu  
 
Let's describe the game process. 
 
4.2. Description Of Multistep Quality Game With 
Several Terminal Surfaces With Alternate 
Steps 
 
At the moment of time  nt 2,...,4,2,0  the first 
player (IP) multiplies the value  tx  by the 
coefficient (rate of change) of growth  . Next, IP 
selects the values              1,0,1,0  tktktutu  
that determine the share of the resource of the first 
player  tx  allocated to the IP on the cybersecurity and on the receiption of additional data 
at the moment of time t. Then the states of the players 
at the moment of time 1t  are determined from the relations (1). That is, the second player (hacker) is 
forced to spent for the cracking the cybersecurity of 
IP the value      txtktus  1 . In this 
expression, it is assumed that 1s - the coefficient 
determining the "effectiveness" of financing of the 
second player for the development or for purchase of 
tools for hacking the cybersecurity of IP. 
If the condition     10,01 00  pptyP   is fulfilled, we will say that the first player (IP) 
guaranteed himself protection with probability 0p  and the procedure of cybersecurity means financing 
is over. Otherwise, the procedure of cybersecurity 
means financing of the first player will continue. 
Then there is a step of a cracker (hacker). He acts 
just like the first player (IP) without using the 
procedure of additional data obtaining. And then the 
states of players are determined from the relations 
(2). If it turns out that after the attacker (hacker) step 
the condition     10,02 11  pptxP  will be fulfilled, we will say that the attacker inflicted 
damage to the IP with a probability more than  11 p . Then the procedure of cybersecurity 
means financing for this configuration of the security 
barriers is over.  
 The first player seeks to find a lot of his initial 
states (InS), which have the following property. 
Property: if the game starts from the InS, then the 
first player can protect his IS by the selection his 
control actions          nttktuku 2,,,...0,0   with a 
probability more than 0p . In this case, IP is able to 
prevent damage from the hacker with a probability 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 
15th January 2020. Vol.98. No 01 
 © 2005 – ongoing  JATIT & LLS   
 ISSN: 1992-8645                                                                  www.jatit.org                                                      E-ISSN: 1817-3195 
 4 
 
more than  11 p . The set of such states will be 
called the set of preferences of the first player. 
Let introduce the following notation: Φ - the set of 
distribution functions of one-dimensional random 
values; 2n - the natural even number close to T;  nT 2,...,2,0*   – the set of natural even numbers. 
Definition. The pure strategy     ,.,..,,.,.. ku  of the 
first player (IP) is the set of functions       1,0:,.,..,,.,.. *  RTku , such, as          .,1,0,,,1,0,,  FFxtkFxtu  
Therefore, the strategy of the first player (IP) is a 
rule that allows him, based on available information, 
to determine the amount of FR, directed to the 
development of cybersecurity systems, and also to 
obtain additional data about the second player 
(hacker). 
The second player chooses his strategy  .v  based on any information. The aim of the first player is to 
find his set of preferences. IP’s strategies are also 
defined, by applying of which he will receive the 
fulfillment of conditions that allow to complete the 
procedure of cybersecurity financing. The strategies 
of the first player with these properties will be called 
his optimal strategies. 
The formulated game model corresponds 
according to the classification of the decision-
making theory to the decision-making problem 
under risk conditions. In addition, such a model is a 
non-linear multistep quality game with several 
terminal surfaces with alternate steps. Finding sets of 
the first player's preferences (IP) and his optimal 
strategies depends on a variety of parameters. 
 
4.3. Determining The Rational Financial 
Strategies Of The Player - Information 
Protector  
 
The IP’s set of preferences, taking into account the 
procedure of additional data obtaining, are differ 
from the sets of the first player's preferences without 
this procedure by the following circumstance. Due 
to the fact that the first player, receiving additional 
data during his step (and spending part of his FR), 
can ensure to himself the achievement of a positive 
result from the states in which he could not do this at 
the absence of this procedure. A large number of 
parameters, different cases in the considered 
problem are "forced" within the framework of the 
article to confine with the considering the procedure 
for obtaining additional information during the the 
steps of the first player. Consideration of cases of 
implementation of the procedure of additional data 
obtaining during the next steps is completely 
analogous. There should be noted that the 
consideration of the procedure of data obtaining at 
the first step affects the entire process of interaction 
at all steps. 
Further we will consider that 01 pp  . 
The set of preferences of the first player at the step 
T  for the case using the additional data procedure 
will be denoted by    ., 001,1 ppV Tk  
1. .1T  
1.1. At 5,00: 00  pp  will be 
    ., 001 1,1 ppV k  
1.2. At 15,0: 00  pp  will be: 
1.2.1. If rrpa  02 , то  
         ,20
22:0,
01
0
00
1
1,1 

 

rrpaxs
rrpax
ppV k 
 
 
The optimal IP’s strategy will be a couple of 
functions     .,.,.,.,.,. ku : 
           ,1.,01 1*2 kFxkk   
 
        ;22 241 0 0
2
2,1 rrp
rrpa
k 
                             
(3) 
 
where  ,01 xs         1.,0* Fxu ;  
at  
 
    .22:0 0  rrpax         (4) 
      ;0.,0* Fxu ;  
 
at 
    .22:0 0 rrpax                   (5) 
 
1.2.2.  At rrpa  02  will be 
    ., 001 1,1 ppV k  
 
2. .312  kT  
2.1. At    the first player's set of preferences 
(IP) can not be constructed.  
2.2. rrpa  02 ; 
Let define the natural 0k  from the condition: 
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,
,,1
0
0
21
1
210
k
k
ss
ssk










  at  .   
 
The first player's set of preferences, taking into 
account the additional data procedure, will be written 
as follows for ,1212 0  kkT at ,0kkk 
where ,1: kk  and 
 
2.2.1. 
    ;2
22
0
0
2
21 rrpa
rrpa
ss
k






  
 
    ;2
22
0
0
1
21 rrpa
rrpa
ss
k






  
 
  ;2
22
0
0
21 rrpa
rrpa
ss 
   
 
   
   
  ,
2
0
22:0
,
0
1
0
00
1
1,1 









rrp
axs
rrpx
ppV k 

      (6)                              
 
    ,, 0012 1,1  ppV kk   for  ;1 kk                               
(7) 
 
   
   
 
 
,
2
0
22:0
,
0
211
0
00
12
1,1




















rrpa
ssxs
rrpax
ppV
k
k
k 


     (8) 
 
 
   
   
 
,
22
22:0
,
0
1
0
00
12
1,1












 
rrpa
rrpax
ppV
k
k
k
k




     (9) 
 
For  .0kkk   
The optimal strategy of the first player will be a 
couple of functions     .,.,.,.,.,. ** ku : 
           ,1,1min.,01 10*2 kFxkk   
 
  
   
 
  ;22
24
0
1
0
0
2
1
2,1 rrp
rrpa
xs
k
k
k





 









        
(10) 
 
at  
   ;022 10 xsrrpa
k


 
   
      1.,0 0* Fxk   
 
at  
 
   ;022 10 xsrrpa
k


 
           
(11) 
 
      1.,0 0* Fxu  
 
at  
    ;22:0 0 
 

 rrpax
k
         (12) 
      0.,0 0* Fxu   
at  
    .22:0 0 
 

 rrpax
k         (13) 
 
The first player's set of preferences, taking into 
account the additional data procedure, will be written 
as follows for ,1212 0  kkT   
 
at  
 
2.2.2.  
00
21
1
210 ,,1
kk
ssssk 







 ,  
at ,   
  ;2
22
0
0
21 rrpa
rrpa
ss 
   
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   
   
 
 
,
2
20
22:0
,
0
1
1
0
00
12
1,1
























rrpa
xs
rrpax
ppV
k
k
k
k 



  
(14)  .,...,1 0kk   
 
The optimal strategy of the first player will be a 
couple of functions     .,.,.,.,.,. ** ku :             ,1,1min.,01 10*2 kFxkk   
 
  
    
 
  ;22
24
00
1
0
0
2
1
1
2,1 rrp
rrpa
xsxs
k
k
k


















     
(15) 
 
Two cases   
 

 rrpa
k
022   
we have:  
      1.,0 0* Fxk  
 
at  
  ;22 0 
 

 rrpa
k             (16) 
      1.,0 0* Fxu  
 
at  
    ;22:0 0 
 

 rrpax
k
     (17) 
      0.,0 0* Fxu   
at  
 
    .22:0 0 
 

 rrpax
k
    (18) 
 
The set of preferences for ,32 0  kT in case:  
 
  ,2
22
0
0
1
21
0
rrpa
rrpa
ss
k







  
 
 will be written as: 
 
   
 
 
 
.
2
2
2:0
,
021
0
21
00
32
1,1 0 











rrpass
rrpa
ssx
ppV kk



 
(19) 
 
The optimal strategy of the first player will be a 
couple of functions     .,.,.,.,.,. ** ku :   
             ,1,1min.,01 10*2 kFxkk   
 
  
 
 
  ;22
24
11
1
0
0
2
21
21
2,1 rrp
rrpa
ssss
k 











                   
(20) 
 
At        rrpass 021 22   we 
have: 
      1.,0 0* Fxu  
 
at  
   ;22:0 021 rrpassx      (21) 
      0.,0 0* Fxk  
 
at   .22 021   rrpass     (22) 
In case: 
    ;2
22
0
0
1
21
0
rrpa
rrpa
ss
k






  
 
   
 
 
 
.
22
2
2:0
,
0
0
21
00
32
1,1
0
0




















rrpa
rrpa
ssx
ppV
k
k
k




       
(23) 
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The optimal strategy of the first player will be a 
couple of functions     .,.,.,.,.,. ** ku :             ,1,1min.,01 10*2 kFxkk   
 
  
 
  
  ;22
24
11
1
0
0
2
21
21
2,1 rrp
rrpa
ssss
k 












       (24) 
 
at  
      rrpass 021 22   
 
we will receive: 
      1.,0 0* Fxk  
 
at  
  ;22 021   rrpass                 
(25)  
      1.,0 0* Fxu  
 
at  
 
   ;22:0 021 rrpassx         
(26)      0.,0 0* Fxu  
 
at  
   .22:0 021 rrpassx          (27) 
 
At 3212 0  kkT  the set of 
preferences of the first player can not be 
constructed, i.e. 
 
     0012 1,1 , ppV kk  at .10  kk   
Let note that the inequality    
 rrpass
xs


021
1
22
0

  
 
determines the area in which the first player (IP) can 
get a positive result for himself at the moment of 
time .3212 0  kkt it means that the 
value  rrpa
sg 

0
2
2
  is analogous to the 
barrier [18]. If we consider the relation  rrpass  021 22   in surface   ax ,0 , where a – the mathematical expectation of 
a random variable  0y , then it determines the line 
of stochastic balance in the problem, taking into 
account the procedure of additional data obtaining. 
 
2.3. ;2 0 rrpa   
The set of preferences of the first player 
     0012 1,1 , ppV kk  at any ,...1,0k  
 
5. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT 
 
In order to test the efficiency and adequacy of the 
proposed model there were performed simulation 
experiments. The objectives of the simulation were: 
1) the definition of a set of strategies of the players 
(IP) and the attacking side; 2) an assessment of the 
adequacy of the mathematical model. 
The results of three computational experiments 
are shown on Fig. 1–3. 
Solutions are obtained for all cases of the relation 
of the parameters of the game considered in the 
work. Using the results of the game there were found 
the optimal variants of the financial strategies of the 
protector of the informatization object. 
The maximum deviation of the results of the 
computational simulation experiment from practical 
data was 9–12%. 
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Figure 1 : The results the computational experiment №1 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : The Results The Computational Experiment № 2 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : The results the computational experiment 
№ 3 
The developed model was implemented as a 
software product Decision Support System (DSS) - 
“The choice of a rational financial strategy for 
ensuring cybersecurity of an informatization object 
(IDSS)”. A general view of the results of the work of 
the DSS is shown on Figures 4. 
During the testing of the DSS there were 
considered situations when two players (the 
protector - Player 1 and the hacker - Player 2) control 
the dynamic system. The purpose of the experiment 
was to determine the set of strategies of the players. 
There were considered cases when the players' 
strategies put them to the corresponding terminal 
surfaces. During the experiment, there were found 
the sets of initial states of objects and their strategies 
that allow objects to lead the system to that or to 
another terminal surface. On the plane, the x-axis is 
the financial resources of the 1st player (protector). 
Y-axis - financial resources of the 2nd player (hacker 
or attacking side as a whole). 
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Figure 4 : Graph displaying in DSS based on game results  
 
Caption: Solution – there was obtained a solution 
in which the allocated financial resources for 
cybersecurity and information protection for an 
informatization object are not sufficient if the time 
of interaction between the sides is limited. In order 
to solve the problem with a greater probability, there 
should be increased the amount of financial 
resources allocated by the decision-maker for 
information protection measures. It is accepted that 
the financial resources of the attacking side are not 
limited. 
The obtained results demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the approach proposed in the article. 
During testing of the model and software product, 
the correctness of the obtained results was 
established. 
 
 
6. DISCUSSION OF SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
There is taken a three-dimensional positive 
orthant in a three-dimensional space –   axt ,0, . 
The time axis t "goes from bottom to top, from zero". 
It is assumed that the parameter t will designate the 
amount of steps of the players. 
In this three-dimensional orthant we consider the 
set of surfaces issuing from the point (0,0,0). 
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Surfaces are perpendicular to the plane   ax ,0,0 . 
These surfaces are defined by the relation: 
  2013 x
n
a 

 
 
for any positive n. The surfaces 
allow to define the set of preferences of the first 
player for n (n – uneven natural number) steps with 
probability 0p  using the additional information 
procedure, i.e. it is believed that 10 pp  . For 
example, a set   001,1 , ppV nk . 
Then   001,1 , ppV nk  is a set 
 
        
      .,01/13
01/13,,0,
2
22








 
nt
xna
xnRaxn
 
 
Then at 1n  will be  
 
            .1,02
0,,0:,0,1, 2
2
00
1
1,1 






 
txa
Raxax
ppV k
 
 
The line:   203 xa   in the surface   ax ,0  
will be a line of stochastic balance.  
Test calculations № 1 (Fig. 1). There is received: 
(0, x(0), a(0))) = (0, 3, 6.5), (1, x(1), a(1)) = (1, 3.5, 
5.5), (3, x(3), a(3)) = (3, 4.0, 5.0), (5, x(5), a(5)) = (5, 
4.5, 4.0), (7, x(7), a(7)) = (7, 5.0, 3.0). There should 
be noted that points are considered in three-
dimensional space   axt ,0, . Trajectory of motion 
is shown by a red curve. 
Test calculations 2 (Fig. 2). The set of 
preferences of the second player (attacking side, i.e. 
there is consider a symmetric task for the second 
player) will look like this. There is taken a three-
dimensional positive orthant in a three-dimensional 
space   axt ,0, . In this orthant we consider the set 
of surfaces issuing from the point (0,0,0) 
perpendicular to the plane   0,, yаt . 
These surfaces are given by the relation: 
  2019,0 y
n
a 

   for any positive n. These 
surfaces allow to define the set of the preferences of 
the second player for n (n – uneven natural number) 
steps with probability 0p , i.e. it is believed that 
10 pp   . 
For example, the set    001,2 , ppV nk   – is the set  
 
     
     
.
,01/19,0
019,0,0,,
2
22









  
ntyna
y
n
Ryan  
 
Then at 1n  will be 
 
         .1,09.1
,0,,1, 2
2
00
1
1,2 






 
ty
aRya
ppV k  
 
The line:     209,0 ya   in the surface   0, yа  
will be a line of stochastic balance.  
There is received: (0, a(0), y(0)) = (0, 5.0, 3.0), (1, 
a(1), y(1))=(1, 4.0, 4.0), (3, a(3), y(3))=(3, 3.0, 5.0), 
(5, a(5), y(5))=(5, 2.0, 6.0), (7, a(7), y(7))= (7, 1, 
8.0). The points are considered in three-dimensional 
space   0,, yаt . Trajectory of motion is shown by 
a blue curve. 
Test calculations № 3 (Fig. 3).  Corresponds to 
the "movement" along the line of balance: 
  203 xa  .  
Here the original task for the first player is 
considered. The following values are obtained: (0, 
x(0), a(0)) = (0, 5, 75.0), (1, x(1), a(1))=(1, 4, 48.0), 
(3, x(3), a(3))=(3, 3, 27.0), (5, x(5), a(5)) = (5, 2, 
12.0), (7, x(7), с(7)) = (7, 1, 3.0). The points are 
considered in three-dimensional space   axt ,0, . 
Trajectory of motion is shown by a green curve. 
Therefore, the adequacy of the refined model was 
confirmed by computational experiments. Also there 
was confirmed the ability of the model to provide 
effective support for decision-making in the field of 
cybersecurity means financing of various IOs. The 
work continued a number of publications by the 
authors [8, 12, 13], in which there were presented the 
theoretical and methodological foundations of DSS 
creation. This work develops these researches within 
the framework of complementing of the existing 
DSS [13, 15] with mathematical models that are 
based on a bilinear multistep quality game with 
several terminal surfaces [15, 18]. The refinements 
in the model eliminate the disadvantages of the 
solutions presented in [8, 13, 19, 20]. Since in [8, 13, 
21–34] there were not taken into account all the 
initial conditions for choosing financial strategies for 
investing in cybersecurity of IO. 
The prospect of further research is the possibility 
of applying the results obtained for the subsequent 
algorithmization of the processes associated with the 
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analysis cybersecurity of IO. In this context, our 
work continues previous publications of the authors 
[35–46]. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Among scientists, quite a lot of authors were 
involved in the description of dynamic controlled 
objects using differential equations [5-10]. They 
propose certain methods of game theory that allow 
solving real practical problems. In [27, 28], there 
were developed methods for finding optimal 
strategies for players in such an interaction. Our 
research has overcome these limitations. In the 
works it was proposed to consider discrete analogues 
of differential equations, but without making a final 
transition from differential equations to discrete 
systems. This circumstance has led to the fact that 
the opposition class of the opposing player must be 
at least functions, have dimensions. Therefore, the 
project idea is to develop an intelligent decision 
support system at investing in various cyber security 
projects of various information systems. Models, 
algorithms, and the DSS itself, which is being 
developed as a part of a study based on bilinear 
differential equations with dependent movements, 
allows constructively finding optimal strategies and 
giving concrete recommendations to investors in 
cybersecurity projects or other large investment 
projects, for example, in the field of Smart City. 
The working hypothesis of the study is following. 
It is assumed that if we develop an intelligent 
decision support system at investing in high-tech and 
at the same time risky projects for the development 
of cybersecurity systems, then due to the fact that the 
basic DSS models are based on bilinear differential 
equations with dependent movements, it will be 
possible to increase the efficiency of choosing 
rational strategies for attracting financial resources 
for the task of investing in cybersecurity of various 
informatization objects. 
There is proposed a refined model of 
cybersecurity system financing for various 
information objects. The proposed variant of the 
refined model differs from the assumption that the 
protection side does not have complete information, 
both about the financial strategies of the attacking 
party, and about the states of its financial resources 
aimed at overcoming the protection boundaries of 
the object of cyberattacks. At the same time, the 
protection side has the opportunity to obtain 
additional data by the cost of a part of his financial 
resources. The last makes it possible for the 
protection side to receive a positive result for himself 
in case when he can not receive it without this 
procedure. 
The solution is based on the method of dynamic 
programming. This allows, in contrast to existing 
approaches, to find more effectively solutions. In 
order to find the solution we also used the 
mathematical apparatus of a nonlinear multistep 
quality game with several terminal surfaces with 
alternate moves. 
The article considers the variants of situations in 
which the information content requires the resources 
of players from the protection of the informatization 
object. 
The results of the simulation experiment are also 
shown in the article. There are considered the 
variants of the optimal behavior of the cybersecurity 
side of the informatization object. Simulation 
experiments confirmed the adequacy of the model. 
The deviation of the results of the simulation 
experiment from practical data does not exceed 9–
12%. 
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